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Trade Policy and the Returns to Investment
Abstract
This paper considers the effect of a firm’s sales location on the relationship between tariffs, exchange rates, and
the flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Much of the FDI literature assumes that an increase in the
average tariff or relative exchange rate will provoke a decrease in foreign investment. This result, however, is
contingent on the firm’s preference for exporting. When the majority of sales for a foreign firm are located
within its own the domestic market, the impact from changes in the tariff and exchange rate are reversed. This
paper further argues that the firm's pre-existing sales orientation(domestic/foreign) will be a factor that
initially determines the influence of tariff and exchange rates on FDI flows. Applying the logic of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, we develop a theoretical framework to predict a variety of consequences for wages and
rental rates in US industrial sectors. Using a series of panel data regressions and a three-equation model, we
generate a policy analysis that incorporates and partially validates our theory. Our final conclusions also call
upon the elasticities of substitution in major industrial sectors as they correspond to changes in trade policy.
This article is available in Undergraduate Economic Review: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol5/iss1/2
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      Abstract:    This paper considers the effect of a firm’s sales location on the relationship between    
tariffs, exchange rates, and the flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Much of the 
FDI literature assumes that an increase in the average tariff or relative exchange rate 
will provoke a decrease in foreign investment.  This result, however, is contingent on 
the firm’s preference for exporting.  When the majority of sales for a foreign firm are 
located within its own the domestic market, the impact from changes in the tariff and 
exchange rate are reversed. This paper further argues that the firm's pre-existing sales 
orientation (domestic/foreign) will be a factor that initially determines the influence of 
tariff and exchange rates on FDI flows. Applying the logic of the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem, we develop a theoretical framework to predict a variety of consequences for 
wages and rental rates in US industrial sectors. Using a series of panel data 
regressions and a three-equation model, we generate a policy analysis that 
incorporates and partially validates our theory.  Our final conclusions also call upon the 
elasticities of substitution in major industrial sectors as they correspond to changes in 
trade policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are a number of factors that can explain the direction, origin, modes, and quantities 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  A country’s overall trade policy will often consider these 
factors in order to maximize the range of benefits that are likely to follow.  While FDI inflows 
will clearly add to the host countries productive capacity, the country may also expect benefits 
that are more ephemeral.  Foreign firms are likely to bring higher levels of technology and 
management skills; the demand for highly skilled workers will increase in tandem with the 
average wage level.  Value-added-in-production for those sectors that are heavily endowed with 
foreign capital, will likely increase along with profits and international competitiveness.  
Increases in efficiency per sector will spill over into other sectors in the form of lower input 
costs.  For many developing countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia, these externalities 
have become an incentive to maximize FDI.  Although the majority of arguments for and against 
protectionist policies might recognize these benefits, many other countries do not always follow 
the most appropriate policy in order to achieve them.  This is expected.  The political climate 
between countries will always be an active influence.  Pre-existing multilateral and bilateral 
agreements will not always change in tandem with a countries comparative advantage.  To model 
politics, however, is no simple task and goes well beyond the scope of this inquiry.  This paper 
will confine itself to one small tangent of a general question: how can a trade policy affect the 
inflows of FDI.  For simplicity, we define a nation's “trade policy” only in terms of its tariff 
schedule and exchange rates.  More specifically then, this paper will investigate a mechanism 
through which tariff and exchange rates influence the inflows/outflows of FDI.   
Although there are many mechanisms, this paper will consider the effect of a firm’s sale 
orientation on the manner in which tariffs and exchange rates are likely influence FDI flows.  A 
firm can sell to its domestic market (home nation), or export to a foreign market.  If we assume 
that a firm has a pre-existing orientation, and that a firm’s foreign investments will mirror the 
profitability of its foreign sales, then we can expect a close relationship between FDI flows and 
the returns to investment.  Changes in tariff and exchange rates will have a strong influence on 
these returns, and therefore, the flows of FDI.  According to our hypothesis, however, the firm's 
pre-existing sales orientation (domestic/foreign) will be the factor that initially determines the 
influence of tariff and exchange rates on FDI flows.  
Even with a simplified understanding of “trade policy,” the situation is not simple; there 
exist a number of hard and soft variables that become relevant when trying to explain FDI flows.  
2
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In line with common sense, a list of these variables has traditionally included: the host market 
size, transport costs, fixed costs of entry, the degree of copyright protection, economic and 
political stability, and the degree of competition already present in the host country.  These 
factors will become more relevant to this paper as control variables when we expand this inquiry 
to include empirical data.   
There are many practical examples in trade that may benefit from a comprehensive 
answer to this general question.  In the mid-1980’s, there was an overwhelming movement 
towards trade liberalization amongst the developing nations.  China and other low-income Asian 
nations flooded the world market with labor-intensive goods, an initiative that was motivated, in 
part, by the benefits of additional foreign investment.  With an increase in exports of low-skill-
intensive goods, these nations could likewise expect a proportional increase in the wages of 
unskilled workers, predicted in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.1  This has not happened yet, and 
a recurrent issue in trade literature exists: where are these wage benefits for unskilled workers? 
At first, this question may seem unrelated to FDI inflows and our general question. Therefore, it 
is also the purpose of this paper to apply our theoretical model to this question, in order to 
demonstrate a linkage and a new perspective. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There are three avenues of theory that converge on our particular model of trade and 
capital flows: exchange rates, tariff jumping, and modes of Multinational Corporation (MNC) 
entrance into a host economy.  Rather than folding each of these topics into the expansive 
literature on FDI, we will discuss each literature individually.   
 
2.1 Tariff Jumping 
 
Some authors argue that a positive relationship exists between tariff rates and the inflows 
of certain modes of FDI.  The rationale is simple for this phenomenon, commonly called “tariff 
jumping.”  In the face of higher import tariffs, an MNC may find it profitable to move its 
production into the target market in order to “jump” over the added costs of exporting.  The 
theory is contentious, and there is only a short history of empirical and theoretical efforts to 
                                                          
1
 For a discussion of this question, consult Martjit (2004), Wood (1997), or Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). 
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confirm/disprove its legitimacy.  Most of the efforts to demonstrate tariff jumping empirically 
have referenced the behavior of Japanese firms in the 1990’s.   Barrell and Pain (1999) for 
example, demonstrate that anti-dumping (AD) protection is positively correlated with aggregate 
FDI inflows from Japan into the United States and Europe.  These finding are confirmed in 
Blonigen and Feenstra (1997), who examine the Japanese FDI flows into the U.S using four digit 
SIC industry-level data.  Belderbos (1997) observes data at the firm level, making a direct 
linkage between AD investigations and tariff jumping cases.  This study uncovers striking 
results.  Affirmative AD decisions will increase the probability of FDI from 19.6% to 71.8% in 
the European Community (EC), and 19.7% to 35.9% in the U.S.  Furthermore, these findings 
confirmed that Japanese firms were 51.5% more likely to tariff jump after an affirmative case, 
compared to the 9.0% by firms from other countries.   
In the theoretical literature, Massimo (1992) proposes a seminal work in a game theoretic 
approach to both confirm and counter the arguments of traditional tariff-jumping theory.  Tariff 
Jumping is confirmed, insofar as the tariff will increase the MNC’s profit incentive for entrance 
by raising the relative price of exporting.  A tariff may thus undermine the host nations efforts to 
protect itself because it provides an incentive for foreign firms to enter the market.  The results, 
however, depend entirely upon the existing market structure within the industry.  With a high 
level of domestic competition or significant entry costs, the benefits of entrance are not likely to 
exceed those of continuing to export.  Ellinsen and Warneryd (1999) present a model that offers 
a solution to the dilemma faced by the tariff-imposing nation.  The government is omniscient and 
able to set a strategic tariff to maximize the protection of domestic firms, while minimizing these 
counteracting effects of tariff jumping.    
To contrast these finding, Bruce (2002) investigates the incidences of FDI per sector and 
per firm in the US, and concludes that tariff jumping is only a viable option for MNCs with 
substantial assets, export volumes, and international experience.  When the results are controlled 
for these variables, MNC’s with Japanese majority ownership do not show any unusual 
propensity to tariff jump.  The findings also offer a crushing comment on the Ellinsen and 
Warneryd (1999) model.  Rather then comparing the benefits and costs in the macro-economy, 
AD investigators only consider what constitutes a “fair price” for the product, as determined by 
the costs of production and transport.  The government is not omniscient, and has not taken into 
account the possible effects of tariff jumping.  This idea is continued in Bruce (2004), where 
there author investigates into the welfare and competition-enhancing properties of tariff jumping. 
4
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In measuring the abnormalities in the estimated stock returns of traded firms that have filed for 
AD investigations, Bruce is able to confirm many of the finding in Massimo (1992).  Distortions 
from an antidumping duty may be offset because higher returns to investment under protection 
may also encourage the entrance of foreign MNCs.  Thus, abnormal returns to domestic firms 
would be lower on average.  While Bruce recognizes that the likelihood of entrance may be 
affected by other variables—such as production costs or rivalry patterns—he concludes that 
Greenfield FDI has the largest negative impact on domestic firm profits.  Bruce also observes 
that tariff jumping is more likely for those firms with considerable trade volumes.  Buckley and 
Casson (1981) found this result to be solid; purchasing a plant in the foreign country will usually 
involve higher fixed costs than exporting.  Although the marginal cost of exporting is lower, the 
average cost of producing in the target market will only be lower when there is a significant 
volume.  From this discussion, we contend that MNC’s are more likely to engage in tariff 
jumping when the majority of its target market is under the protection of foreign import tariffs.2 
Increased tariffs may also deter firms from investing.  Kravis and Lipsey (1982) examine 
the decisions of US multinational firms in the location of their overseas production.  They 
conclude that openness in the host nation is indicative of easy world market access, and lower 
prices for material inputs in the production process of the foreign multinational affiliates in the 
host nations.  Furthermore, Tuman and Emmert (2004) confirm this positive relationship 
between openness and FDI for those MNC’s that intend to use the “recipient country as a base 
for intra-regional production.”  The rationale is simple: in the case that the products are intended 
for export, higher protection rates will result in higher input costs in the production process, and 
lower profit margins for the firm.  The institution of tariffs may also indicate an overall trend 
towards protection in the host nation.  With higher tariffs, the nations trading partners may 
institute retaliatory tariffs so that exports to the partner nations must face a disadvantage.  
Therefore, for those MNC’s that intend to export rather than sell to the domestic market, an 
increase in tariffs will actually decrease the FDI inflows.3  
 
 
2.2 Entry Modes 
 
                                                          
2
 Refer to Figure 1, Box 2 
3
 Refer to Figure 1, Box 4 
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This paper intends to develop a model that is useful for policy recommendation. It may 
then be helpful to understand which types of FDI are likely to respond to which incentives and 
the degree that entry modes differ. A multinational firm can enter a foreign market through any 
of three ways: Greenfield FDI, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), or exporting.  In one attempt 
to clarify these distinct modes, Koru (2004) uses as game theoretic model applied to firm-
specific data for majority owned Swiss MNC’s.  The findings confirm an array of factors that 
influence different firms in their decision of entry mode.  Although Koru cannot validate the 
tariff-jumping argument, larger firms that are more heavily invested in R&D research are more 
likely to enter through Greenfield FDI.  These firms would prefer to use their own technology, 
and probably enjoy a considerable degree of scale economies.  M&A entry however, offers a 
firm fast market access to a sales market or efficient inputs.  Considerable trade and fixed costs 
had a more significant negative impact on acquisitions than on Greenfield FDI.  Hill (1990) 
confirms these results by showing that the presence of large monopoly rents in the host country 
will usually disfavor the entrance by acquisitions compared with that by Greenfield.   
 We would like to make a note on Koru (2004) that could explain the lack of results 
supporting the tariff jumping argument.  It could be that the inconclusive variables on the 
Greenfield FDI-response are the result of an improper method of disaggregating the different 
types of FDI.  Why should FDI responses follow these categorizations?  The MNC’s reasons for 
investing are not always unique to the mode of entry.  Perhaps it is the case that the aggregated 
group of firms that enter using Greenfield, do not demonstrate tariff jumping; but why aggregate 
according to this descriptor? After all, this is only an entry mode, and there is no consistent 
relationship between the firm characteristics as identified per entry modes, and reasons for 
investing.  Why not assess the degree of tariff jumping by disaggregating according to entry 
costs? Or firm size? It is true that Koru (2004) found correlations between these variables and the 
mode of entry—but this result may suffer from aggregation bias because the connection between 
entry mode and the reasons for investment are accidental in many cases.   Why not consider the 
location of sales, or the market size and trade volume when making classifications? By 
considering the influence of sales location on the MNC’s decision to enter, this inquiry will 
address the aggregation bias issue.  
 
2.3 Exchange Rate Influences 
 
6
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 5 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol5/iss1/2
7 
 
In the literature on FDI determinants, there exists a plethora of articles that consider the 
costs of investing: sunk costs, fixed costs, input costs, and transportation costs are all relevant to 
a MNC.  Exchange rates, however, will also influence the final impact that these variables may 
have on the MNC’s profits in terms of its home currency.  Kohlagen (1977) and Cushman (1985) 
show that foreign production costs decline with a depreciating foreign currency, thus raising the 
profit incentive and stimulating FDI.  Froot and Stein (1991) confirm these results in a model of 
an imperfect capital market, where a devaluation of the currency can lead to an overall decline in 
relative wealth, and may then encourage foreign acquisition.4  Not all research, however, is 
unanimous in showing this relationship.  In one study showing the outward FDI flows from the 
United States to 12 developing nations, Gorg and Wakelin (2002) show that an appreciation of 
the host currency is actually positively correlated with FDI flows, and a depreciation relative to 
the dollar is negatively correlated with FDI flows.5  How can we resolve this discrepancy in 
results? Chen (2006) examines the impact of exchange rate movements on outward Taiwan FDI 
flows into China.  In this paper, Chen distinguishes between Market and Cost oriented firms; 
“market” oriented refers to those firms that locate a subsidiary within a target market as the mode 
of entry.  “Cost” oriented firms are those that locate production facilities in a country because the 
costs of production are relatively lower.  These firms are export-oriented because the products 
are not sold in the country of manufacture.  This paper develops a simple math model to 
demonstrate a few factors that influence the expected net-present-value-of-investing in China for 
Taiwanese firms.  There is one central conclusion: the location of foreign MNC sales will 
determine the impact that exchange rate movements have on FDI flows.  We will discuss this 
model in more detail in the following section.   
We must also account for the volatility of exchange rates as a control in our empirical 
model.  Lin Chen and Rau (2002) discuss the effects of exchange rate volatility on the timing of 
foreign direct investment for Market and Cost (export) oriented firms.  They conclude that there 
is a divergent trend; under exchange rate uncertainty, market oriented firms are likely to delay 
investment while cost (export) oriented firms may actually accelerate FDI activity.   
 
 
 
3. THE MODEL 
 
                                                          
4
 Refer to Figure 1, Box 1 
5
 Refer to Figure 1, Box 3 
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 Following the model and empirical research in Chen (2006), there are two sectors of 
firms in an open economy: “market” and “cost.”  Market sector firms are those MNC’s that have 
the majority of their sales market within the boundaries of the host nation.  The cost sector firms 
are those MNC’s that have the majority of their sales market elsewhere; the only motivation for 
investing in the host nation is the cost incentive.  Chen defines this term in his empirical model 
as follows. 
 
Market Sector: If the percentage of an industry’s sales in China in its total revenue is 
significantly greater than the weighted-average percentage of all industries at the 5% 
significant level, then the industry is referred to as market-oriented.  These usually include 
such sectors as: Mining, transportation, storage, services 
 
Cost Sector:  If the percentage of reverse-imports of an industry from China in its total sales 
is significantly greater than the weighted-average percentage of all industries at the 5% 
significant level, then it is referred to as cost-oriented. 
 
This distinction between market and cost-oriented is useful to understand the impact of 
exchange rates.  For market-sector firms, a revaluation of the host currency will increase a firm 
revenue’s in terms of the home nations currency. Every host nation sale is now worth more.  
Under the same revaluation, however, a cost sector firm will only experience an increase in host-
nation wages relative to home-nation revenues; profits for the cost sector MNC have decreased.  
The opposite situation holds true for the devaluation of the currency.  This relationship is shown 
below in boxes 1 and 3 of Figure 1.  
Our model goes beyond Chen (2006) to explain the impact of tariffs on FDI flows in terms 
of the M and C sector distinction.  In our above discussion on tariff jumping, we have 
incorporated two avenues of literature.  
1) Papers that confirm tariff jumping for those firms with a large trade volume into the host 
nation: Barrell and Pain (1999), Blonigen and Feenstra (1997), Belderbos (1997), Massimo 
(1992), Ellinsen and Warneryd (1999), Bruce (2004), Buckley and Casson (1981).  These 
papers suggest that market sector firms as defined by Chen, will also be more likely to tariff-
jump.   
8
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2) Papers that confirm that tariffs will negatively impact FDI inflows: [Kravis and Lipsey 
(1982), Tuman and Emmert (2004)].  This literature suggests that import tariffs will deter 
cost sector firms from investing FDI in the host nation.   
Therefore, given what we understand about exchange rate and tariffs, and their respective 
influences on market and cost sector firms, we can redefine these sectors according to figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The Market and Cost Sectors 
 
 Exchange Rate Revaluation 
 
Tariff Rate Increase 
Market Sector 
(majority of sales in the country 
of investment) 
(1)  
FDI increases 
(2)  
FDI increases 
Cost Sector 
(majority of sales outside the 
country of investment 
(3)  
FDI decreases 
(4) 
FDI decreases 
 
For the visual people, we show the divergent relationship between incidences of FDI and trade 
liberalization for market and cost sector firms. 
 
Figure 2: A Visual 
 
   
 
 
3.1 The Present Value of Investing: Chen’s Model 
 
Chen offers a few equations to formalize his argument.  Although we greatly simplify the 
model, these equations will be useful when we develop our own model for testing the relevance 
of tariffs and exchange rates.  Beginning from the profit equations, we have an outline for the 
9
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basic characteristics of market and cost sector firms as a function of the exchange rate (R).  
Given these definitions: 
 
Vm, Vc = The expected present value of the market and cost-oriented firm that stays in the 
market.  
R = the exchange rate  
P, P*
 
= the price in the foreign and domestic market respectively 
W
 
= the wage rate in the foreign country 
d = the discount rate 
u = the growth rate of the exchange rate 
E = the exchange rate 
Ft = the total value for a firm to invest 
 
we have the following equations for profit. 
 
 ΠM(R) = PfR – WfE   (1) 
 
ΠC(R) = Pd – WfE    (2) 
 
These are then developed into equations that express the present value of investing in the host 
economy, as a function of the exchange rate.   
 
Vm = (P – W)E    (3) 
d – u 
 
Vc = P*  – W E    (4) 
         d    (d – u) 
 
If the country is going to maximize the total inflows of FDI, they should maximize the Ft 
 
 Ft = (Vm + Vc) / 2   (5)  
 
To include tariffs in this model, we only have to define P in terms of P* as affected by the ad 
valorem tariff rate, t.  The foreign price will increase by same proportion as the tariff, such that:  
  
 P = (1 + t)P*     (6) 
 
Whenever there is tariff, P > P*, and all other variables held equal, Vm will increase while the Vc 
term will decrease.  Thus with tariffs, market firms are more likely to tariff jump than cost firms.  
For the time being, this model satisfies our basic requirements for showing the divergence of 
market and cost sector firms in the face of tariffs and exchange rate movements. 
 
10
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3.2 Trade Liberalization: Basudeb’s Model 
 
This model has a few limitations that require some attention.  First, these equations show 
only short term changes in the value of investing, and ignore the costs of capital.  Second, the 
Chen model does not endogenize the wage rate, such that there is no link between prices, wages 
and capital.  There is no way to show the broader impact that tariffs and re/devaluations can have 
on the economy as a whole.   Therefore, this paper will refer frequently to the theoretical 
framework developed by Basudeb (1999), in which he develops a 2X3 and 3X3 framework to 
demonstrate some ambiguities and consequences of trade liberalization. Its conclusions call upon 
the Stolper Samuelsson (SS) predictions of the Heckschire Ohlin framework, and further assume 
that FDI can be tariff-jumping.  When exchange rates devaluations are also assumed to increase 
the returns to foreign capital, then Basudeb contends that trade liberalization (lower tariffs and 
devaluations) must have ambiguous effects on FDI inflows.  Even though tariffs raise the return 
to capital, a revaluation must increase the cost of labor, such that the firm’s profits are 
ambiguously defined.   
The model, however, misses the distinction between the market and cost sectors.  
Basudeb defines trade liberalization as a policy that will devalue the exchange rates and lower 
tariffs.  In his two sector, two factor trade model described below, there is no mechanism to 
account for 1) the negative impact that tariffs can have on inflows of foreign capital (into the cost 
sector) and 2) the positive impacts that revaluations can have for foreign capital (into the market 
sector).  This problem arises because rather than distinguishing sectors by the origin of revenue 
and location of sales(market/cost distinction), sectors are distinguished in accordance with 
tradition, that is, by the origin of capital (foreign/domestic).  In doing so, Basudeb fails to 
recognize that “foreign capital” cannot be neatly aggregated into one variable.  When exchange 
rates and tariffs are taken into account, the returns to capital are influenced heavily by the 
location of sales.  For this reason, our inquiry intends to adapt the Basudeb model to account for 
the market and cost sector distinction.   
 
w, r   The rewards paid to labor (wages) and capital (rent), respectively 
M   The traditional importable sector (using domestic K capital only) 
Y The traditional exportable sector : (using domestic K capital only) 
X  The modern exportable sector: (using foreign Z capital only) 
L  The quantity of labor in the domestic market (used in both X and M) 
K, Z   The quantities of domestic and foreign capital, respectively 
Py, Py*  The domestic and world price of the traditional exportable sector 
11
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Pm, Pm*  The domestic and world price of the traditional importable sector 
Px, Px*  The domestic and world price of the modern exportable sector 
aij   The quantity of the (i) factor required to produce the commodity (j).  alm is Therefore 
the quantity of labor used importable sector.6  
Өij   The factor shares of the (i) factor in the (j) industry.  Өlm is therefore the labor’s share 
of cost in the importable sector 
(   )   Any variable with this symbol above it, denotes the relative change in that variable. 
Therefore (E) signifies the relative change in the exchange rate, or dE/E.  Positive 
values of (E) will signify a devaluation. 
E  The domestic exchange rate: domestic currency per unit of foreign currency.  
Increasing values will signify a devaluation. 
T = (t + 1) or the nominal tariff rate (t) on the importable good plus one.  
 
The competitive zero profit conditions of the importable and exportable sectors are given by the 
following equations. 
 
 almw + akmrk = Pm = EPm*T   (7) 
 
 alxw + akxrz = Px = EPx*  (8)  
 
These competitive zero-profit equations are then differentiated to obtain the following 
 
 Өlm w + Ө km rk = E + T  (9)  
 
 Өlxw + Өzx rz = E   (10) 
 
Where the price reflects the value of the marginal product of the input, in this case, labor. 
 
Pm = w (alm  / Өlm)    (11) 
 
After some manipulation, Basudeb is able to verify his predicted result for a two sector model: 
 
 rz = E – TβmӨlx   (12) 
       
βӨzx 
 
Where β is the elasticity of labor demand in the whole economy, and βm is the labor demand in 
the importable sector.  The terms interact such that a exchange rate devaluation (positive values 
of E), Tariff reduction (negative values of T), and increased rents and thus likelihood of tariff 
jumping, are compatible goals.    
 
                                                          
6
 For clarification on the terms used in this model, please refer to Jones (1956); our explanation here borrows 
heavily from this article.   
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3.3 The Stolper Samuelson Effect 
 
In this section, we will briefly explain the Stolper Samuelson (SS) theorem in the context 
of this paper, and how it is relevant to tariffs and exchange rates.  Because the Basudeb model 
implicitly uses the same assumptions and structure, it is very easy to incorporate the predictions 
of the SS theorem.  There are two possibilities, or “cases,” that could result from trade 
restriction/liberalization.  What is the SS theorem? Derived from the simple framework of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin Model, the SS model demonstrates how the relocation of production factors in 
an environment of changing commodity prices, can actually decrease economic welfare while 
trade is expanding.  There are extreme assumptions that have historically limited its use in real-
world situations.7   
 Costs of production depend on wages of factors 
 The supply of these factors in each economy is fixed 
 Goods of a particular industry are perfect substitutes for one another 
 Transport costs and technology differences do not exist 
 There is complete factor mobility between industries 
 Perfect competition and full employment 
 
 Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) provides a rich context for this theory to develop.  The central 
insight of this model is that a country will export products that use relatively intensively those 
factors-of-production in which the country is relatively abundantly endowed.  A country will 
import those products that require the relatively intensive use of those factors that are not 
endowed in relative abundance.  The Stolper-Samuelson theory demonstrates how this link 
between inputs of factors and outputs of goods, is also parallel to the link between wages of 
factors and prices of goods (Wood 1995). In other words, a decrease in the price of a product will 
cause a decrease in the factor used relatively intensively in the production process. 
 Consider a small open economy where there are two factors of production (market and 
cost sector capital) and two commodities (raw materials, and software); using the symbols from 
our explanation of Basudeb and some intuitions gained from Chen with respect to which sectors 
are likely to be either market or cost sectors, raw materials (M) uses market capital (rk) relatively 
intensively while software (C) uses more cost sector capital (rz).  Because we have assumed 
perfect competition and complete factor mobility across industries, the factor payments to market 
capital must be equal across industries; the same holds for cost sector capital.  The actual 
quantity of rental returns to K or Z will equal their respective marginal products.  Therefore, the 
13
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marginal physical product of M and C must be the same across industries, even though the factor 
intensity and rents for rk and rz  will remain different.  Changing prices for either factors-of-
production (Z or K) or commodities (C or M) will affect the optimal rz and rk ratio; this happens 
because an increase in the rewards to an industry will increase the production of that commodity.  
Thus, “the price of each good produced must in equilibrium be equal to its unit production 
cost”(McCulloch 2005), or simply, the zero profit conditions that we have defined above in 
equations 7 and 8 above.  We can see the relationships between industries in the following 
equations, where  
  
 rk, rz  The rental rates for market and cost sector capital respectively. 
 M, C The quantity of the commodities of raw materials (M) and Software (C), 
respectively 
 
akm  ( rk / rz) rk  + akc ( rk / rz) rz = PM     (15)  
azm ( rk / rz) rk + azc ( rk / rz) rz = PC     (16) 
 
In these equations, aij ( rk / rz) indicates the quantity of input of factor (i) in producing 
good (j) that will be cost minimizing.  Therefore, akm (rk / rz) is the quantity of market sector 
capital used in the production of raw materials, that will be most efficient.  Insofar as there are 
increased rewards, the marginal product changes in tandem with changes in the rental ratio (rk / 
rz).  This means simply that a country’s quantity and direction of production is determined by the 
relative price of each good, or simply:  
 
(Pm / Pc)        (17)  
 
To assume that a sector will use a mixture of capital ( rk / rz) , is an assumption that gives this 
model a little more practical application.  In this way, we are able to show the relative changes in 
rewards to capital as the tariff structure changes for/against the different sectors (M and C).   
Normally, SS (Stolper Samuelson) model would predict that a price increase, would 
result in a similar increase in the price of the input used most intensively in the production 
process, and reduce the rewards to the other sector.  If we assume that our country is producing a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7
 Most notable is the assumption for constant technology; the literature suggests that changes in technology are the 
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homogenous product that uses market sector capital relatively intensively, an autonomous 
increase in the price of the market sector good will increase the price of market capital (here 
denoted as r(m) rather than r(k)).  This will encourage the country to substitute r(m) for now less 
expensive cost sector capital (here denoted as r(c) rather an r(z)).  If we look below to figure 3, 
we can see this process happen in the context of a one commodity, two factor model.  According 
to the Stolper Samuelson theory, an increase in the rental rate of market sector capital will 
accompanied by a lower share of market sector capital in the production process.  Isoquant I 
moves to the position of isoquant II, showing a lower share of r(m). The budget line with slope – 
r(c)/r(m) becomes less steep and matches with a higher rental rate of r(m).   This process is a 
prediction that we call Case 1.  
 
Case 1) Trade restrictions negatively impact the returns to cost sector capital (rc) even 
while the price (Pc) increases.  The opposite can be shown for the market sector capital 
(rk).  This is our basic theory, but it is important to demonstrate because the results are 
counterintuitive.   
 
However, there is an alternative.  The situation could also resemble the diagram in figure 
3.2   if inflows of capital are so extreme that the returns to investment actually decrease from the 
increased supply of capital,8 and market sector firms dominate the economy, then what would 
happen with an increase of tariffs and exchange rates? The returns to market sector capital would 
now increase, so much so that the an influx of foreign capital will increase the quantity of r(m) 
country wide.  The rental rates will now decrease from the oversupply, and the share of now 
cheaper r(m) used in the production process would increase, shown by a movement of Isoquant I 
to the position of isoquant II, and the now steeper slope of  – r(c)/r(m).  This process is what we 
call Case 2. 
 
Case 2) This is a more extreme case.  When trade restrictions increase the returns to 
market capital, the supply response from tariff jumping and exchange rates is so extreme 
that it may actually decreases the returns to market capital.  The same effect may happen 
for the cost sector; in the case of a tariff reduction and price decrease, rc may increase so 
much as to illicit an inflow of foreign capital, thus decreasing rc and neutralizing the 
effect of liberalization.  The results in Bruce (2004) confirms that this could happen in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
most popular and well-documented explanation for price and wage changes, i.e. Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) 
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some circumstances where competition in the host market is weak.  This affect is 
analogous to the J-curve effect; the empirical observation that exchange rates have a 
tendency to over adjust in the short run.   
 
 This framework is not a refutation of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem for one major 
reason.  The SS framework assumes no international capital mobility, and fixed quantities of 
capital.  This begs the question: why should we ever compare this model to the SS theorem? 
Because our contention rests on the assumption that some industries may have an extremely 
strong positive elasticity of capital flows or substitution.  A large positive value could readjust 
the proportions of fixed capital for a nation that exists in autarky.   
 
Figure 3:  
The Stolper Samuelson Theorem: Case 1 and Case 2 
 
Figure 3.1: Case 1     Figure 3.2: Case 2 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8
 Refer to Bruce (2004) for a discussion about this being a real possibility. 
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3.4 Elasticities  
 
These equations refer only to the rents paid to capital in the market and cost sectors.  In the SS 
theorem we assume perfect capital mobility, and we must also assume that the price of Z is the 
same across sectors, and the same holds for K.  In Basudeb (1999), however, Z and K are unique 
to the cost and market sector, respectively.  Therefore we have adopted the approach in the SS 
model, to answer questions posed in the Basudeb model.  Case one is a simple statement of our 
hypothesis.  Case two is more extreme, and it would depend on the elasticity of capital’s 
marginal product.  This paper goes more in depth into the elasticities of substitution between 
market and cost sector factors of production in Appendix A.1.  
 
  
 βM =    ãkm – ãzm   or  βM = (ãkm + ãzm) – ãlm  (18) 
  
             (( r	k / r	z) r	k) – Ẽ – T)         ( r	k / r	z) r	k - (w	 – Ẽ – T	) 
 
Or it may depend on the elasticity of substitution between market and cost sector capital.9 
 
 βM =    ãkm – ãzm   or  βM = (ãkm + ãzm) – ãlm  (19) 
  
  r	k – r	z                                 (r	k + r	z) – w	  
 
3.5 Effects on “r” and “w”  
From our discussion about wages and rents, we can make the following predictions with 
respect to the effects of price changes (because of tariffs and exchange rates) on the returns to 
market sector capital, cost sector capital, and the wage rate of a homogenous labor force.   
 
Figure 4: Summary of Results 
  
 Returns to w 
 Prices Returns to rk Returns to rz Cost Sector 
Dominates 
Market sector 
dominates 
Trade 
Liberalization 
Decrease Decreases Increases Increase Decreases 
 
Trade 
Restriction 
Increases Increases Decreases Decreases increases 
 
 
Notice how the wage rate will either decrease or increase depending on which sector dominates 
(that is, constitutes the majority) the economy of the host country under the conditions of either 
                                                          
9
 Assuming as we already have for this extension, that these are not mutually exclusive categories of capital. 
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trade liberalization (decreasing tariffs and devaluations) or trade restriction (increasing tariff 
rates and revaluations).  When we look at the United States where the majority of foreign 
investment is market oriented, compared to Taiwan where the cost sector dominates, perhaps we 
would expect to see this mechanism show itself as a decrease in the wage gap between nations.   
Of course, in reality there is no such thing as homogenous labor force, nor is there any 
real political connection between tariffs and exchange rates.10 Many countries will lower tariffs 
and watch their exchange rates rise from the increased foreign demand of their (now) more 
accessible products.  In other cases, however, a country may forcibly maintain their currency 
below value to encourage other countries to buy their products, and thus, effectively devalue 
their currency.  Or a developing nation’s trading partners may have currencies that are 
appreciating faster than their own.  We have seen these trends in China, some South America 
countries, and many of the developing Southeast Asian nations since the late 1990’s.  
 
4) The Empirical Model 
 
The predictions of our theoretical model (that is, Case 1) are in accordance with Stolper-
Samuelson predictions; however, the subtle mechanisms have changed.  Rather than expecting a 
direct relationship between world product prices and wage rates, we now expect multinational 
firms to mediate that relationship.  Because tariffs and exchange rates influence the returns to 
multinational firm investment, the Stolper Samuelson predictions must now also take into 
account tariffs and exchange rates.  What data and which countries are the most appropriate to 
use to test this model?  Given the frameworks in Chen (2005) and Basudeb (1999), it would be 
helpful if our data followed the proceeding descriptions. 
1) The country should be large and relatively open to investment; there will be more 
incidences of FDI when trade volumes are also large, and ad-valorem tariffs should 
only have a significant impact for high trade volumes.11   
2) The country should have floating exchange rates to avoid any distortions from an 
over/undervalued currency. 
                                                          
10
 There is no political linkage, but there is an economic one; an increase in the tariff rates will cause upward 
pressure on the domestic currency, because US citizens are now buying less foreign goods. 
11
 Bruce (2002). pg 36 
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3) Although Chen (2005) assumes that there are only imports, and reverse exports (those 
exports that are imported back into the home country)12 there is no reason per se that 
we should follow Chen’s approach.   
4) We do not have access to the detailed firm-level data that was used in the Chen study, 
so the highest degree of disaggregation is necessary to show how industries react 
differently to tariffs and exchange rates.  Detailed industry data is a requirement.  
 
Although this paper has an implied focus on the FDI in developing countries, there are 
developed nations that fully satisfy all of these requirements.  This paper will use trade/capital 
flow data for the US and Japan between 1980 and 1999 across major sectors.  Between these 
trading partners, there is a considerable degree of trade and direct investment data that is widely 
available and accurate.  Both nations also have floating exchange rates.   
We will approach the data from at least three directions. 1) Using a panel data regression, 
we will investigate into the influences that exchange and tariff rates have on FDI.  This model 
will use fixed effects in the regression because we assume that each industry will have a 
particular orientation towards either selling domestically, or exporting.  2) Then, using a two 
equations model with two-stage least square regressions, we will make a policy analysis about 
the benefits and costs of raising or lowering tariff and exchange rates in each individual industry, 
and finally 3) to test Case 2 we will observe the elasticities of major industrial sectors as they 
correspond to changes in the tariff and exchange rates. 
 
4.1) Panel Data Regressions 
We will need two regressions because of data limitations.  Tariff data is not widely available or 
even meaningful, at the high level of aggregation that we are using in this model.  Our first 
regression is not able to include tariff data because it will look into 10 broad sectors of the 
economy.  This first regression will only be able to assess the importance of the MC ratio as it 
impacts the way that exchange rates influence the inflows and outflows of FDI.   The second 
regression will look more intimately into four industries within the manufacturing sector, and can 
therefore include a measure for the average nominal tariff rate.   
 
 
                                                          
12
 In the Chen model equations, there is only domestic and foreign exchange rates; there is no world rate. Also, See 
Huang (2005) for a discussion about reverse imports. 
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Panel Regression 1: 
 
To estimate the relationship between exchange rates, FDI, and the orientation of an 
investing firm (MC ratio), we will use a panel data approach to observe the inflows of Japanese 
FDI per major industry in the US for years between 1980 and 1999.  The theoretical model that 
we estimate is as follows: 
 
 FDI = f(ER, ERVOL, MC, WAGE)      (20) 
 
 Or, to be more specific: 
 
FDIit = β0 + β1MCit + β2ERit + β3ERVOLit + β4WGit +    (21) 
β5(MCit*ERit) +  
β6(MCit ERVOLit) + ε 
 
FDI Real values of total FDI inflows per industry from Japanese owned US affiliates.  
This is the dependent variable. 
 
ERVOL:  The exchange rate volatility in terms of yen per dollar.  This is likely to be a 
positive influence for cost oriented firms, while a negative influence on market 
oriented firms. 
 
MC*ERVOL Whenever MC and ERVOL have different signs, MC*ERVOL should be positive.  
For example, if MC is positive and ERVOL is negative, then MC*ERVOL should 
be positive, showing that a market oriented firm will invest whenever the 
volatility of exchange rates would otherwise have a negative impact on FDI 
inflows.   
When MC is negative and ERVOL is positive, then MC*ERVOL should remain 
positive, showing that cost oriented firms are attracted to investing under these 
conditions.   
Whenever MC and ERVOL have the same signs, MC*ERVOL should be negative 
for the same reasons.  
 
MC: The percentage of domestic sales of totals sales in each industry for foreign 
majority owned MNC’s.  This value will range between 0 and 1, with market 
oriented firms having values closest to 1.  We expect the sign of this coefficient to 
be the same sign as the sign on the ER coefficient. 
 
ER Nominal Exchange rate of the foreign currency (yen) in terms of the US dollars.  
This term is important for the interaction terms.  We expect the sign of this 
coefficient to the same as the sign on the MC Coefficient. 
 
MC*ER When both MC and ER are positive, MC*ER should be positive 
When both MC and ER are negative, MC*ER should be negative 
20
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When MC and ER have opposite signs, then FDI flows are happening irrespective 
of either MC ratios or exchange rates.  For example, +MC, -ER, +MC*ER, shows 
that market oriented firms are investing without concern for the exchange rate. 
 
WG The Ratio of the US real wage rate over the foreign countries real wage rate.  This 
controls for the cost incentive of investing in the host nation, and we expect that 
this variable will be unambiguously negative.  
 
CAP  The capacity utilization rates per major US industrial sector from 1980 until 1999.   
 
KL The capital labor ratio for all major US industrial sectors from 1980 until 1999, or 
more precisely, the ratio of “fixed capital stock” to “equivalent persons employed 
full time.” 
 
TAR The average nominal tariff rate of each industry for major industrial sectors.  This 
data is only reliable for the years 1981 until 1989.  We include more highly 
aggregated proxy values into our three equations model (in Section 4.2) for all 
other years.   
 
T  A simple time trend variable 
 
KLCAP The elasticity of the capital labor ratio, with respect to changes in the capacity 
utilization rate.  Refer to appendix A.1 for a full explanation of what this variable 
signifies.   
 
WGUS The US average wage per year for full time persons employed in the industry.   
 
Figure 5: Panel Regression 1 
 
Dependent Variable: FDI 
Sample: 1980 1999 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 200 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficients Standard Error t-Statistic P-Value 
MC? 2340.446 13426.97 0.174309 0.8619 
ER? -90.22561 70.67371 -1.276650 0.2039 
ERVOL? -151.0825 552.8808 -0.273264 0.7851 
WG? 825.4646 873.5168 0.944990 0.3464 
MC?*ER? 104.1064 76.31116 1.364235 0.1748 
MC?*ERVOL? 206.7812 603.9502 0.342381 0.7326 
ER?(-2) 118.6405 72.50074 1.636404 0.1041 
MC?*ER?(-2) -134.0207 76.34681 -1.755420 0.0815 
T? 610.0069 274.5826 2.221579 0.0280 
AR(1) 0.860846 0.099021 8.693534 0.0000 
 
R-squared 0.852908 F-statistic 43.16622 
Adjusted R-squared 0.833149 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
S.E. of regression 1963.350 Durbin-Watson stat 2.058611 
Fixed Effects Coefficients 
_CHEM—C -18332.93 
_FOOD—C -16747.69 
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_INSURE--C -8686.439 
_MACH—C -2889.883 
_MANUF--C -18101.57 
_METAL--C -9376.746 
_REAL—C -11662.22 
_RETAIL--C -12986.27 
_WHOLE--C -17049.97 
 
  
 The first thing we note about this final regression is that the signs on MC and ER are 
opposites.  As we have mentioned, when MC and ER have opposite signs, then FDI flows are 
happening irrespective of either MC ratios or exchange rates.   Also the sign on the WG variable 
is now incorrect, because it has changed to positive from negative.  One the many changes we 
have made in this regression, however, is the inclusion of a lagged ER term.  Because 
multinational companies may move slowly to react to market signals, the exchange rates in the 
past could have more explanative power than present exchange rates.  The sign for the ER(-2) 
term is positive, and therefore consistent with MC term being positive.  MC*ER is not negative 
however, which contradicts our model.   Therefore, even the lagged ER term is not consistent 
with our hypothesis.  The only coefficient sign that confirms our hypothesis, is the MC*ERVOL 
variable because it is positive. 
 Unfortunately, the second thing we should notice is that none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level except for MC*ER(-2) which now carries 
the wrong sign.  Because there were serious problems with autocorrelation in other 
specifications, we added the autoregressive term AR(1) as a control.  The Durbin Watson 
statistic is 2.097, showing that we have adequately controlled for autocorrelation.  The AR(1) 
coefficient is also very significant, showing that it should remain in the model as a control for 
serially correlated residual values.  This regression also corrects for heteroskedacity because 
there are several possible sources of inconstant variance.  1) Data entry errors: between 1980 and 
1999 the trade classification systems changed dramatically, and it is likely that as categories 
changed, so has the variance.  2) Growth in trade between the US and a developing Japan, leads 
to growth in the variance of trade.  For these reasons, we have corrected the regression with the 
White method.  Also, the fixed effects coefficients are very unstable, as their signs and values 
change dramatically between different specifications.  This seems to indicate that the model is 
unstable and not adequate at explaining the inflows and outflows of FDI. 
 
Panel Regression 2: Major Manufacturing Sectors 
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 Unfortunately, we are unable to estimate the same regression equation with tariff rates: 
FDI and tariff data are not always published for compatible industry classifications.  Therefore, 
we are forced to explain the MC ratio, not FDI flows, in terms of tariff and exchange rates for 
only four of the industries within the manufacturing sector: Primary metal production (METAL), 
Miscellaneous manufacturing (MANUF), chemical production (CHEM), and industrial 
machinery (MACH).  But how can we simply assume that the MC ratio and FDI flows are 
synonymous?  They are not equivalent but they are definitely related, as we will see in regression 
2 and the two equations model shown in the following section.   
 Throughout much of this paper, we have assumed that MNC’s had a pre-existing 
orientation towards the domestic or export market; but there is no reason to suppose that a profit 
maximizing firm could not change its orientation over time to adjust to a changing environment.  
We can expect all firms to sell more domestically when exchange rates increase, because any 
sale will now yield more profit for the MNC in terms of the home currency.  Any increase in the 
exchange rate should put upwards pressure on the MC ratio.  Tariffs rates put similar pressure on 
the MC ratio because increased tariff rates will put upwards pressure on input prices for the 
production process.  Those firms that are accustomed to exporting will now find that their 
products are less price-competitive because the cost of production has increased.  Therefore, cost 
oriented firms will be more inclined to sell domestically; again we see that the tariff rate puts 
upwards pressure on the MC ratio.   
 But have we not just argued for an impossible circle? When tariffs and exchange rates 
increase, the MC ratio increases.  When the MC ratio increases, the impact of tariffs and 
exchange rates will unambiguously increase the quantity of inflows of FDI.  In this situation, any 
increase in tariffs and exchange rates will unambiguously increase FDI.  To some degree, this 
may be true, but there are a number of provisos.  1) Tariffs and exchange rates do not always 
move in the same direction.  2) Firms are oriented towards the domestic or export markets.   
They are not likely to quickly change their orientation quickly, or in accordance with short run 
variables like exchange rates.  All the same, we have made the relationship clear between the 
MC ratio, FDI inflows/outflows, and tariff and exchange rates.  Assuming this relationship, we 
use a panel data regression with the following model to explain the MC ratio in terms of tariffs, 
exchange rates, and the FDI flows. 
 
MC = f(ER, TAR, FDI)      (23) 
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 Or, to be more specific: 
 
MCit = β0 + β1ERit + β2TARit + β3FDIit + ε    (24) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Panel Regression 2 
Dependent Variable: MC 
Sample: 1981 1989 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 32 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficients Standard Error t-Statistic P-Value 
ER? -0.000567 0.000252 -2.252774 0.0320 
TAR? -0.015049 0.028168 -0.534244 0.5972 
FDI? -6.51E-06 6.80E-06 -0.958133 0.3459 
 
R-squared 0.618408 F-statistic 7.832894 
Adjusted R-squared 0.539458 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000045 
S.E. of regression 0.060547 Durbin-Watson stat 1.091326 
 
Fixed Effects Coefficients 
_CHEM—C 1.042809 
_MACH—C 1.044202 
_MANUF--C 1.040266 
_METAL--C 1.172173 
 
 We should first notice that every coefficient has the wrong sign.  The expected values for 
ER and TAR were both positive, and insofar as ER and TAR raise the MC ratio, FDI should also 
increase in tandem with ER and TAR; all three independent variables should be positive.  
Furthermore, only ER is significant with a t-statistic of -2.25.  When we look to the entire 
regression, we see that explanatory power of the equation is also poor.  Although the f-statistic is 
significant, the adjusted R2, at a value of 0.61, is poor for a time series panel regression.  The 
Durbin-Watson statistic is showing signs of autocorrelation, although with only 32 observations 
and 8 years of data, an AR(1) term would only take away from the degrees of freedom.  Again, 
we have a regression model that does not adequately explain the MC ratio, or FDI 
inflows/outflows.   
 
4.2) A Three Equations Model 
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 The unsatisfactory results of regressions one and two could be a result of endogeneity in 
the independent and dependent variables.  In this section we develop a three equations model to 
explain and predict values for FDI, MC, and WGUS.  Why do we need three equations? Not only 
can the MC ratio influence the relationship of tariff and exchange rates on FDI, but we should 
also consider how tariffs, exchange rates, and FDI influence the MC ratio.  Furthermore, given 
our discussion regarding the Stolper Samuelson Theorem, we can expect the wages of a 
particular industry to be endogenous as well.  How so?  The existing wage rate in a country can 
have a strong influence on a firm’s likelihood of investing.  When the cost of labor is lower, cost 
of production is lower, profits are higher, and so is the incentive for direct investment.  This is 
the reason why we included a wage ratio (WG) of US and Japanese industries.  Even more 
importantly however, an increase in the wage rate of a particular industry will encourage a 
substitution of labor for capital.  Or different types of labor and capital can become substitutes 
for each other; whether there is an exchange of foreign for domestic capital, or high for low 
skilled labor.  These substitutions will be influenced and reflected in the capacity utilization rates 
and capital/labor ratios of an industry.  We can expect to find these substitutions in the MC ratio 
of any given industry, insofar as this ratio reflects a firm’s preference for either export or 
domestically oriented factors of production.  For this reason we have included the US wage rate 
per industry (WGUS) into the MC equation.  And yet, insofar as capital labor ratios and capacity 
utilization rates can influence WGUS and MC, there should be included another set of 
parameters to control for WGUS as a separate function.  Therefore, we have three equations that 
collectively account for the changes in FDI, MC, and WGUS.  These equations are shown below. 
  
FDI = f(MC, WG, ER, ERVOL, TAR) 
 MC = f(ER, TAR, FDI, WGUS, KL) 
 WGUS = f(TAR, KL, CAP) 
 
Or to be more specific: 
 
 FDIt = β0 + β1MCt + β2WGt + β3ER(-1)t + β4ERVOLt + β5TARt + ε    (26) 
MCt = β0 + β1ER(-2)t + β2TARt + β3FDIt + β4WGUSt + β5KLt + β5KLCAPt + ε (27) 
WGUSt = β0 + β1TARt + β2KLt + β3CAPt + β4Tt + ε     (28) 
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 In contrast to our panel regressions, this model is estimated using the set of time series 
data belonging to a particular industry.  Because of data restrictions, we are only able to estimate 
this model for the following industries: Primary and Fabricated Metals (METAL), Chemical 
production (CHEM), non-electrical machinery production (MACH) and miscellaneous 
manufacturing (MANUF).  Also, because reliable data for TAR only spans between the years 
1981 until 1989, the series of graphs shown below is limited to that time period.  The results for 
the three equations regressed against the data for the four industries, are shown below in figure 4.   
 We should note a few interesting characteristics of the coefficients.  1) Because all of 
these industries are what can be called “market oriented” (with an MC ratio higher than 0.5), the 
coefficients for a particular variable across industries should be identical.  With only a few 
exceptions, however, the coefficients for each variable across industries will change dramatically 
in size and value.  2) Few of the coefficients are significant.  With the exception of WG in 
equation 1, or the coefficients in equation 3, all other variables are insignificant at the 0.05 level 
of significance.  3) We should note the positive coefficients on ER in equation 2.  In contrast to 
our earlier findings in regression 2 where ER, TAR, and FDI were all negative, we now see at 
least a divergence of tariff and exchange rate influences.  Although these findings are still 
contradictory to our model, they are still helpful for understanding the relationship between 
tariffs, exchange rates, and FDI, as we will discuss below.  4) We can assess the equations in 
general by looking first to the adjusted R2 statistic. The R2 is abysmal for the second equation, 
and even becomes negative for the CHEM regression.  In equations 1 and 3, however, the 
regression equations explain an average of almost 70% of the variation of the dependent 
variable.  As we have already remarked about the panel regressions, heterskedacity and 
autocorrelation are likely to be an issue.  All of our regressions were corrected by the White 
method, and the WG equation includes a time trend variable.  Unfortunately because there are so 
few observations, we were unable to include an autoregressive term to correct for 
autocorrelation.   
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Figure 7: Regression Results for FDI, MC, and WGUS Equations 
 
  Variables  Adj R2 
 Equations MC WG ER ERVOL TAR KL WGUS FDI CAP KLCAP T  
CHEM -2881.1 
(-0.5396) 
-890.93 
(-2.7984) 
-12.225 
(-1.8456) 
10.636 
(0.1141) 
-301.48 
(-0.7477) 
      0.7735 
 
METAL -115422.0 
(-1.18028 
-4702.41 
(-3.21959) 
-6.8911 
(-0.2216) 
158.71 
(0.7599) 
3592.44 
(1.1226) 
      0.8799 
 
MANUF -12545.7 
(-0.9475) 
-584.77 
(-1.4710) 
13.27 
(2.414) 
81.726 
(1.0681) 
-1057.6 
(-0.961) 
      0.4452 
 
Equation 1 
FDI 
MACH -14935.1 
(-0.2266) 
-9704.1 
(-6.6350) 
-22.258 
(-0.2967) 
227.05 
(0.7169) 
4163.79 
(0.4205) 
      0.8789 
CHEM   0.0064 
(1.2524) 
 -0.5795 
(-1.3881) 
-2.8056 
(-1.4554) 
-0.0661 
(-1.44) 
0.0002 
(1.1407) 
 -0.0189 
(-0.6224) 
 -0.057 
METAL   0.0001 
(0.6035) 
 0.0532 
(0.7144) 
-0.0092 
(-0.7010) 
-0.0022 
(-0.6011) 
-1.71E-06 
(-1.3051) 
 0.0004 
(0.7864) 
 0.7298 
MANUF   0.0007 
(1.8553) 
 -0.0209 
(-1.4981) 
0.0159 
(0.4811) 
0.0152 
(0.9258) 
-1.11E-05 
(-0.6695) 
 -0.0009 
(-0.4260) 
 0.1194 
Equation 2 
MC 
MACH   0.0015 
(1.7262) 
 -0.2093 
(-1.3197) 
0.0316 
(1.058) 
0.0214 
(0.978) 
-4.06E-06 
(-0.4583) 
 0.006607 
(0.7036) 
 0.5997 
CHEM     -7.3799 
(5.2964) 
-33.101 
(-12.979) 
  0.2900 
(1.7254) 
 2.8823 
(0.0000) 
0.9544 
METAL     9.866 
(1.754) 
-1.964 
(-4.226) 
  0.3364 
(3.663) 
 1.2184 
(0.0000) 
0.853 
MANUF     1.1658 
(6.9556) 
-1.5626 
(-32.628) 
  0.1996 
(3.1890) 
 1.4245 
(0.0000) 
0.9879 
Equation 3 
WGUS 
MACH     3.1395 
(0.7002) 
-1.3489 
(-9.2129) 
  0.3728 
(3.1190) 
 1.7499 
(0.0000) 
0.9289 
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Graph Series 1:  
Although our regression results cannot confirm our theoretical model, we can refer to the series of 
graphs (figures 5-8), to see how well the model predicts changes in actual values of the dependent 
variables.  When comparing the actual vs. baseline values for the model, the are some striking 
similarities..  The baseline solution will often follow the changes in direction of the actual values.  
Graph series 1 consists of 12 graphs: 3 dependent variables for each of the 4 industries. 
 
Graph Series 2 and 3:  
To test the responsiveness of this model to changes in the tariff and exchange rate, we have 
included graph series 2 and 3.  In graph series 2, we show a comparison between the baseline 
regression and “scenario 1,” which is the recalculated baseline values for a 30 percent reduction in 
the exchange rate.  In graph series 3, we compare the baseline against “scenario 2,” which the 
change from the baseline from a 30% depreciation of the exchange rate, and a 30% reduction in the 
tariff rate.  Therefore, we can say that scenario 2 shows the impact of “trade liberalization” on four 
manufacturing industries.    
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4.3) Baseline vs. Actual:  
Graph Series 1 
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4.4) Policy Analysis of Exchange 
rate devaluation: Graph Series 2 
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4.5) Policy Analysis of Trade 
Liberalization: Graph Series 3 
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5.) Conclusions 
 
 There are few important things to note about these results.  1) We hypothesized that FDI 
and the MC ratio would always move in the same direction, while wages should follow FDI 
flows; both variables are linked to a firm’s revenues and returns to investment.  For most 
industries, however, the graphs show that FDI and MC move in opposite directions.  Under 
exchange rate depreciation, or “complete liberalization,” we can see that FDI usually increases, 
the MC usually decreases, and the wage rate usually decreases. These results can be explained by 
economic theory.  When the exchange rate depreciates, domestic firms will find it cheaper to sell 
their products abroad; as they export more, the MC ratio will fall.  Our theory differs insofar as 
we expected the fall in exchange rates and tariffs to also bring about a fall in the returns to 
investment for market oriented firms.  For every fall in the exchange rate, the firms would suffer 
a loss of profits; because we implicitly assumed that the MC ratio was stickier than FDI 
inflows/outflows, we hypothesized that every exchange rate change would affect FDI flows more 
than the MC ratio.  It seems, however, that firms are able to rapidly change the ratio of domestic 
to foreign sales, which allows them to avoid the losses in revenue from exchange rate changes.  
Therefore, when exchange rates depreciate, the MC ratio will decrease rather than inflows of 
FDI; foreign firms can become more export oriented in order to take advantage of the now 
cheaper US assets under exchange rate depreciation.  
 2.) Because our model does not include ER in the equation for the MC ratio, all the 
results for scenario 1 in Graph series 2 show that exchange rates have no influence on US wages.  
This is a limitation of our model.  We predicted that exchange rates changes are too short term to 
directly influence wages, which reveals our assumption that wages are sticky in the short run.  
Rather than directly influencing wages, all short run changes in the exchange rate would 
influence US wages via the capacity utilization rate (CAP).  We included tariffs (TAR) in the 
wage equation, because we assume that tariff rates change more slowly than exchange rates.  
Firms can makes plans for the future based on current values of the tariff rate, while they cannot 
do so for the exchange rate.  In this model we assumed that all exchange rate changes would 
manifest themselves in the return to capital, which intern would effect the capacity utilization 
rate, and therefore US wages  
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 Why do wages fall under trade liberalization? A standard response would be competition.  
Lower trade restrictions means that more firms are able to compete with each other on a level 
playing field.  There is more competition, lower product prices, and therefore lower factor prices 
and wages.  The Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that a reduction in the price of a good, will 
reduce the price of the factors of production used relatively intensively in the production of that 
good; as market sector goods become cheaper, so does labor.  But in terms of our model, what 
does this mean?  When wages follow the MC ratio, there are two possible implications.    
 
1) When trade liberalization makes it more profitable to be export oriented, we predicted 
according to case 1, that ‘cost sector capital’ would become more expensive, which 
would encourage a substitution of cost sector capital for market sector capital.  As we 
said, r(c) would increase, while the quantity of (r) decreased.  The rental rates of market 
and cost sector capital are inversely related.  These four industries are all market oriented, 
which means that under trade liberalization, we should expect the rental rates to decrease.  
And because the rents have decreased, wages have decreased.  We see evidence for this 
in the positive relationship between CAP and WGUS; as capital becomes more ‘utilized’ 
and ‘valuable,’ so does labor.  When market capital becomes less valuable, so does 
market sector labor and FDI should decrease; but this does not happen.  Why does FDI 
not follow the MC ratio and wages? This brings us to the second possibility.   
 
2) The elasticity of the MC ratio means that we cannot neatly distinguish between market 
and cost sectors.  If there is difference in the factors of production between these two 
sectors, it is unobservable.  Therefore, when there is trade liberalization, exporting 
becomes more profitable, all firms (even market-oriented firms) become more cost-
oriented, and wages should increase.  And yet we see that wages decrease when FDI 
increases!  Perhaps we are seeing a situation similar to Case 2, in which the oversupply of 
foreign firms actually bids-down the price of labor.  Because this FDI is coming because 
assets are less expensive (cost oriented), and not because a firms revenues have increased 
in terms of the home currency (market oriented), domestic wages are more contingent on 
world prices and world wages.   
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Therefore, although we cannot neatly distinguish between market and cost sectors, 
perhaps we should still think in terms or MC ratios, or being oriented towards the “market” or 
the “cost” benefits of investing in the host country.  If trade liberalization re-orients domestic 
industries towards exporting, and exporting is always cost-oriented, we cannot then conclude that 
“cost-oriented” is synonymous with a “decrease in domestic wages.”   
This paper was not intended as an argument against ‘liberalizing trade,’ because most of 
the results are incomplete. There are a few avenues to expand our understanding of the 
relationship between the MC ratio, FDI, wages, rental rates, exchange rates, and tariffs.  Firstly, 
we could investigate into the elasticities of the MC ratio and FDI flows with respect to changes 
in the tariff and exchange rate.  Because these elasticities may differ between countries, 
industries, or industry sectors, this information may be useful when assessing the costs and 
benefits of a government trade policy.  Secondly, we can include a fourth equation for the 
capacity utilization rate that is somehow dependent on the exchange rate.  Thirdly, find data for 
the service sectors and other industries that are more export oriented.  Unfortunately, nominal 
tariff rates do not apply to many of these sectors, so it may be difficult to positively identify the 
degree of trade restriction.   
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7.) Appendix  
 
A.1.) Case 2 and Factor Substitution 
 
 But what about Case 2? In section 3.4 we delineate some of the differences between Case 
1 and Case 2.  The most important distinction between cases, is the responsiveness of industries 
to follow incentives brought about by tariffs and exchange rates.  For Case 1, when the sector is 
dominated by market oriented firms, and there is trade restriction, we can expect the rental rate 
of market sector capital to increase, and the usage (or share) of that capital should decrease.  For 
Case 2 however, the rental rates should decrease (because there is an oversupply) and the share 
of market sector capital should increase.  Therefore, looking at the elasticities of the share of 
capital with respect to the rental rate, we can determine the degree and direction of 
responsiveness to see if Case 1 or Case 2 dominates.  The elasticity can be calculated by the 
following expression where KLa is the average KL ratio for all observations. 
 
(CAPt – CAPt-1 / CAPa)  
 
(KLt – KLt-1 / KLa) 
 
This expression is analogous to  %∆r 
%∆ait 
 
If these values are weak and negative for an industry, then that industry is following the 
prediction of Case 1.  If the elasticity values are strong and negative, then that industry is 
following the predictions of Case 2.  The results shown below in Figure 3, however, do not show 
any conclusive results either way.  At a time when consistently negative values for the elasticity 
would confirm our hypothesis, we calculated both positive and negative values.  Therefore, the 
data that we were able to include was not able to confirm the hypothesis. 
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Figure 8: 
Elasticity of the CAP/KL Ratio
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A.2.) Another practical application 
 
In the introduction of this paper, we presented a problem: why have the wages of unskilled 
labor not shown a proportional increase with the demand for unskilled labor.  According to the 
standard SS argument, a reduction in barriers of trade would balance the discrepancy in prices 
between trading nations.  If textiles are an unskilled intensive good, we would expect the price of 
textiles to be lower in the developing nations, and higher in those that are developed; the opposite 
case should hold for the rental rates on machinery.  A reduction in tariffs should equalize the prices 
of textiles between nations, forcing up the price of textiles and pushing down the price of 
machinery.  This price increase will raise the value of the marginal product of unskilled labor, raise 
the wage and encourage more unskilled employment.  If the factor content of the exporting sector is 
relatively unskilled labor intensive, the argument continues, then increased openness and exporting 
should raise the wage of unskilled labor, and close the wage gap.  Wood (1997) presents an 
extensive review of literature on this subject, and cites a number of empirical papers that confirm 
the unskilled labor intensity of the export sectors.  These papers however, are unable to confirm a 
closing wage gap in South America.  While many Asian nations (such as the Tigers) show some 
upwards trend in the wages of unskilled labor, Mexico and South America continue to suffer a 
growing differential.  This defies most standard explanations: minimum wages, union activity, 
political turmoil and differences in infrastructure have all been controlled for in the calculations.    
What are some explanations? Latin America is better endowed with natural resources and 
land. 1) It could be that all manufacturing imports acted as substitutes in Latin America, whereas 
only skill intensive manufactures were imported as substitutes in Asia.  Therefore, non-traded 
sectors in Latin America must be more skill intensive relative to the non-traded sectors in East Asia.  
This is one possibility that Wood calls “farfetched.”13 2) Unskilled labor in Latin countries may be 
less mobile. 3) This may be the impact of technology biased trade, where openness also allows a 
nation to have access to technology, and in the interest of securing future growth, an economy will 
often foster biased growth in those high-tech industries.  4) The increased openness of third world 
nations since the 1960’s has effectively flooded the world’s labor market with unskilled workers.  
there is no easy linkage between trade openness and the differences that we can observe in the wage 
gaps of South America and Asia. This paper offers a fifth explanation. If Case 1 holds true in third 
world circumstances, then I argue that trade liberalization, in combination with the abundance of 
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natural resources and demand for goods in South America, fosters primarily cost-sector growth 
which may have been less skill-intensive given our discussion of the modes of entry and the 
characteristics of firms.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
13
 Now, consider this argument carefully; the reasoning is very similar to what this paper contends, with one significant 
difference.  According to Wood, wage gaps occur because of import competition in the sector that is most traded and 
least skilled.   
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